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The Antebellum U.S. Iron Industry: Production Estimates and Import Competition
1.  Introduction
The role of import tariffs in promoting the growth of U.S. manufacturing in the
antebellum period remains a highly contested question.  American manufacturers of the period
are usually portrayed either as fledgling newcomers that could not have survived without
protection from foreign competition, or as heartier enterprises whose success did not depend
upon tariffs but on tailoring their products to the particular circumstances of the domestic
market.  Both contemporary observers and economic historians have debated which perspective
is a more accurate portrait of early American manufacturing.
1 
The vulnerability of the antebellum iron industry to foreign competition has been
particularly controversial.  Writing in the late 1840s, Henry Carey (1872, p. 83) argued that
should the United States have “perfect freedom of trade . . . the result would be the stoppage of
every [iron] furnace in the Union.”  By contrast, Frank Taussig (1931, p. 135) believed that
“there is no reason to doubt that, had there been no duty at all, there would yet have been a large
production of anthracite pig- and rolled iron.”  When duties on imported iron were significantly
reduced in the mid-1840s, Swank (1897, p. 86) noted the “paralyzing effect” it had on the
industry.  Alternatively, Grosvenor (1871, p. 25) concluded that “No one who attentively
considers the record of our foreign trade will fail to observe that the influence of changes of
tariff, either to check or to stimulate importations, has been much less than has commonly been
supposed.”-2-
How dependent on tariff protection were antebellum iron manufacturers?  Answering this
question has been hampered by the lack of production data for much of the antebellum period. 
The standard annual estimates of domestic pig iron output, based on Fogel’s (1965) calculations, 
start in 1840, with a few scattered observations from the 1820s.  The short span of production
data prior to the Civil War makes it difficult to determine the impact of import competition and
tariff protection on domestic production.  In addition, the 1840s was a particularly volatile
decade in which the industry was buffeted by large changes in import prices and in import
duties, both of which contributed to a severe import shock between 1847 and 1853.  During this
period, imports soared while domestic production was sliced nearly in half. 
This paper seeks to enhance our understanding the antebellum iron industry’s
vulnerability to foreign competition and remarkable volatility in the 1840s in two ways.  First,
we revise Fogel’s (1964) existing production data from the 1840s and extend the series back to
1827.  We supplement the new production data with new calculations of the volume of imports
and the precise level of the tariff on pig-iron related products.  These data give us a general
picture of the state of the antebellum iron industry and allow us to examine a consistent set of
figures on domestic production, imports, import prices, and the tariff during the period 1827 to
1859.  
Second, we use these data to estimate a simple reduced-form partial equilibrium equation
that explains movements in U.S. pig iron production.  This allows us to disentangle the effect of
import competition and tariff changes on domestic iron output, as well as general economic
conditions in the United States.  The results indicate that domestic production was highly
sensitive to changes in import prices, implying that a substantial part of the industry’s output-3-
2 In 1912, the AISA changed its name to the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI).  The
historical pig iron production data are reproduced in the Census Bureau’s Historical Statistics
(1975, M-217).  Today, the AISI continues to provide shipments data for the Federal Reserve
Board’s monthly industrial production index.
3  As Paskoff (1983, p. 77) notes, “Attempts to ascertain the size of the domestically produced
national supply of pig, bar, and rolled iron have not been particularly successful and are clouded
with uncertainty.  In part, this failure has been due to defects - deliberate and inadvertent - in the
reports the iron produces made at various times, but especially in 1832 and 1849.”
would not have existed without the tariffs on imports.  However, consistent with Engerman
(1971), a significant decline in British export prices, rather than the U.S. tariff reduction, was
mainly responsible for the sharp fall in domestic output in the late 1840s.  
2.  New Estimates of U.S. Iron Production, 1827-1843 
This section reviews the existing estimates of early American pig iron production and
describes the data and methods used to push these existing series back to 1827.  Annual
production data for the antebellum period date from the founding the American Iron and Steel
Association (AISA) in 1854.  From its start, the AISA conducted mail surveys of the nation’s
forges and foundries in order to determine the quantity of pig iron produced.  While these AISA
tabulations are viewed as comprehensive and credible, considerable contention surrounds the
reliability of earlier national output estimates that the trade group adopted.
2  Motivated by the
absence or shortcomings of contemporary census returns, various organizations periodically
undertook the task of estimating national iron production before the AISA’s formation. 
Unfortunately, the misinterpretation or intentional mishandling of survey data, perhaps because
many of these groups had a vested interest in influencing the ongoing tariff data, resulted in
vastly different accounts of output before 1854.
3  -4-
4  The correct 1830 estimate (180,000 gross tons) was amended in the Friends of Domestic
Industry pamphlet and is superior to the plagued McLane Report (Paskoff 1989, xxix).  
The first two columns of Table 1 illustrate the extent of the statistical discord.  Column 1
is obtained from the AISA’s Annual Report (AISI 1918, 9–10), U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1975, series M-217), and Historical Statistics (2006, series Db74).  Beginning in 1854 the AISA
series represents actual production compiled from its industry-wide surveys and is commonly
regarded as de facto benchmarks.  The earlier figures were adopted from census returns and
secondary sources.  Figures from 1828 through 1830 were initially gathered by the 1831
Philadelphia free trade convention.  The New York Friends of Domestic Industry (1832), a
protectionist trade group, accepted the convention’s estimates for 1828 and 1829, but provided
revised figures thereafter to demonstrate the (positive) impact of the Tariff of 1828.  The 1840s
was also a period of intense controversy.  The AISA adopted Carey’s (1872, 11) subjective pro-
tariff extrapolations for 1842 and from 1847–49, but dismissed his 1840 figure.
Column 2 reflect estimates that Temin (1964, 264–65, table C.1) deemed “reliable” based
upon his discussion in appendix A (see especially pp. 233–45).  Temin notes that the figures
adopted by the AISA for 1828–30 are inaccurate in that they include the pig iron equivalent of
wrought iron production; Pearse (1876, 278) reports the appropriate figures.
4  However, Temin
rejects Pearse’s estimates for 1831 and 1832: Pearse’s 1831 figure is an erroneous compilation of
Carey’s 1830 estimate, while the 1832 figure is simply an extrapolation.  He also disregards
Carey’s estimated range (215,000 – 230,000 gross tons) for 1842 since Carey extrapolated
downward U.S. output from defective Sixth Census returns to conform to his belief that the iron
industry was severely depressed.  Similarly, Temin contends that an appropriate interpretation of-5-
5  For a concise series comparison, see Fogel (1964, 154, table 5.1).
6  This series was originally created as a component to a broader study of early U.S. industrial
production in Davis (2004).  However, Davis (2004) did not elaborate on the details of the
construction of the early pig iron production series and it is presented here for the first time.
the 1846–49 AISA–Carey data lies between Carey’s pro-tariff figures (upper bound) and
Grosvenor’s (1871) opposing pro-trade estimates (lower bound).
5
Column 3 presents Fogel’s (1964, 151-167, table 5.6) reconstructed annual estimates
from 1840 through 1853, the period he considers most “wrapped in confusion.”  Fogel created
these estimates by inflating Pennsylvania benchmarks to U.S. levels.  Specifically, Fogel
estimated the quantity of U.S. pig iron produced for years with missing or dubious figures by
fitting a quadratic trend through known U.S.-to-Pennsylvania output ratios, i.e., the observed
U.S.-to-Pennsylvania ratios reported for 1839/40 (Sixth Census), 1844 (Home League), 1849/50
(Seventh Census), and for 1854–1856 (AISA surveys, from Lesley (1859, 750)).  Pennsylvania is
an appropriate choice because the state was the century’s largest producer of pig iron and trade
groups periodically conducted surveys of the state’s furnaces.  Fogel’s estimates are valuable in
reassessing the controversial picture of national production during the 1840s and have been
widely accepted.  Many researchers, such as Paskoff (1983) and Calomiris and Hanes (1994),
have merged the Fogel and AISA data to form a continuous U.S. pig iron series from 1840.
The revised production series presented here was also created by employing Fogel’s
intuitive procedure, with several important modifications.
6  First, because Fogel was only
concerned with inflating post-1840 Pennsylvania data, his trend, as illustrated in Figure 1, turns
out to be inaccurate in deriving earlier estimates.  The Fogel curve would grossly overstate pre-
1840 output since the trend implies a tenuously low Pennsylvania share in the early 1800s.  (For-6-
7  Bold figures refer to existing estimates from previous surveys or research.  Quantities for 1841,
1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1849, and 1850 agree with Fogel (see Table 1, column 3). 
Pennsylvania’s 1842 estimate is based on a furnace survey conducted by the state's Coal and Iron
Association, which held a convention of iron masters in Harrisburg.  Since the response rate to
the Harrisburg circular was low (only 79 of the 210 known furnaces responded), estimates issued
separately by two of the association's members vary, based on the productivity assumptions
made for the excluded establishments.  Both estimates assume that average productivity at
unreturned furnaces was below average, contending that such establishments were of “inferior
class” and were often operated on a part-time basis.  Childs (1847, 587) placed 1842 output at
194,580 gross tons.  Reeves (U.S. Congress, Senate 1849, 809) calculated production at 151,885
tons in a letter to William Meredith.  The latter figure has been accepted based on the discussion
in Temin (1964, 237–38) and Paskoff (1983, 75, table 20; note that Paskoff incorrectly assigns
Childs’s 1842 Harrisburg estimate to 1840) and should therefore be interpreted as a lower bound
for total output.  Fogel’s implication for 1842 Pennsylvania output is untenable: returned firms
alone produced 84,885 gross tons of pig iron that year, and Reeves’s lower bound would imply
Pennsylvania accounted for two-thirds of U.S. production as expressed by the Carey–Fogel
estimate.  Pennsylvania counts for 1828 and 1830 originate from surveys conducted by the 1831
Philadelphia convention.  According to returned schedules, Pennsylvania pig iron production
was 28,515 gross tons in 1828 (24,822 tons pig iron + 3,693 tons of direct castings) and 36,562
gross tons in 1830 (31,056 + 5,506), as summarized in Childs (1847, 584–85) and Paskoff (1983,
75, table 20; note Paskoff’s 1830 figure erroneously omits castings).  Philadelphia convention
members arrived at national estimates (see Table 1, column 2) for these years by assigning mean
output at the unreturned furnaces the average of those returned.  This approach, however,
significantly understates aggregate Pennsylvania output, as there was an obvious regional bias in
completed schedules.  Specifically, 44 of the 63 furnaces responding in 1828 and 45 of the 73 in
1830 were located in Pennsylvania, while a disproportionate number of unreturned circulars
pertained to more distant establishments, who presumably did not make the longer trip to
Philadelphia (Smith 1847; Paskoff 1983).  This hypothesis is bolstered by the fact that the 19
out-of-state returns in 1828 were predominantly located in nearby states (11 in New Jersey; 5 in
Maryland; 2 in Virginia; and 1 in Delaware).  The convention noted that of the 129 furnaces
unreturned in 1830, many were located in states completely un-represented in the survey,
example, applying Fogel’s trend to Pennsylvania benchmarks generates the counterintuitive
result that American iron production in 1810, approximately 300,000 gross tons, roughly equaled
that observed in 1840.)  Indeed, the pre-1840 Fogel plot contradicts prevailing theories
concerning the spatial and technological developments in the early iron industry. 
Consequently, Fogel’s inflation curve has been recalculated by incorporating pre-1840
Pennsylvania output shares.
7  The revised trend in Figure 1 displays a more consistent, muted U--7-
including all of New England, Tennessee, New York and Ohio. These states possessed a
significant number of charcoal furnaces.  While the over-representation of Pennsylvania firms in
the Philadelphia survey does not affect the national totals, it surely biases downward the share of
output attributable to Pennsylvania (PA output was not inflated by the committee).  Failing to
account for this survey bias would lead to a spuriously low PA-to-US trend (see Figure 1) and
would thus overstate U.S. iron output during the 1830s.  An attempt to correct for this regional
response bias is made by accessing additional data on furnace counts at the state level as a
mechanism to properly inflate Pennsylvania output in 1828 and 1830.  The number of
operational furnaces was compiled from information in Lesley (1859), Smith (1851),
“Documents” (1851), Swank (1878, 1892), Bining ([1938] 1973), and Paskoff (1983). 
Pennsylvania output was then imputed from the underlying weighted average of Pennsylvania
and out-of-state returns, adjusted to reflect the number of additional unreturned Pennsylvania
furnaces in the inflated totals.  Pennsylvania’s revised output share was checked against non-
Pennsylvania furnace data from existing case studies and federal and state censuses.  The
procedure appropriately revises downward the survey's share of Pennsylvania furnaces in 1828
from 70 percent (reported, unadjusted, non-inflated) to 36 percent (adjusted, inflated).  The
latter share is more consistent with the ratio of Pennsylvania iron furnaces reported in the
broader 1810, 1832, and 1840 national canvasses.  The revised state furnace shares were
subsequently used to arrive at Pennsylvania estimates in column 4 based on the 1828 and 1830
U.S. estimates discussed in column 2.  Note that changes in Pennsylvania output between 1828
and 1830 accord well with increases in new charcoal furnace capacity constructed in the state
over this period (Smith 1851).  Non-bold state figures have been interpolated on pig iron
shipments descending from the Lehigh and Schuylkill iron districts, home to the major anthracite
coal deposits in eastern Pennsylvania.
8 The deficiencies in the 1810 manufacturing survey have been well documented, most cogently
by Fishbein (1963).  While evidence exists that iron returns outside of Pennsylvania were
erroneously tabulated, the Pennsylvania iron industry also voiced considerable dissatisfaction
with the deficiencies in the reported state totals.  By incorporating Pennsylvania’s returned 1810
share (49.9%, see Coxe 1814) in the calculations, the census bias is assumed to be distributed
symmetrically between Pennsylvania and all other iron–producing states.  That said, the final
results are resilient to changes in the 1810 observation because trend values before 1827 are
discarded. 
shape, yet closely resembles Fogel’s curve after 1840.  There are compelling reasons why the
revised (quadratic) trend shown in Figure 1 should be more accurate.  While Pennsylvania
accounted for roughly one-half of domestic output around 1810, American iron production was
nevertheless decentralized insofar as most states had charcoal iron forges to meet local
blacksmithing demand.
8  Scholars on the pre-Civil War iron industry, most notably Bruce-8-
9 Auxiliary data in Lesley (1859), Grosvenor (1871, 192), and Paskoff (1983) support this claim.
Records of charcoal-furnace construction indicate that new Pennsylvania iron capacity lagged
additions elsewhere until the mid-1830s.
([1931] 1967), Warren (1973), Paskoff (1983), and Knowles and Healey (2006), have noted that
iron production was spatially diversified in the 1820s and early 1830s on account of accentuated
frontier development.  The combination of high transportation costs and a reliance on blast-
furnace technology, meanwhile, hampered Pennsylvania furnaces from reliably serving distant
markets.  Coupled with the frontier discoveries of iron-ore deposits and the widespread use of
charcoal technologies, Temin (1964, 240–41) argues that Pennsylvania’s iron industry lost
market share throughout the 1820s to more rapidly growing states.
9
Confidence in the revised curve in Figure 1 is bolstered by several factors.  First, the new
ratio curve implies that Pennsylvania began to regain market share by the mid-1830s with the
emergence of anthracite coal as an alternative smelting fuel.  The relationship between
Pennsylvania’s market share and the share of pig iron produced with non-conventional fuels is
documented in Table 2.  Following the development of the hot blast, anthracite rapidly replaced
charcoal as the primary mineral fuel in eastern Pennsylvania blast furnaces.  Since anthracite
deposits were highly concentrated in eastern Pennsylvania, Temin (1964, 241) argues “the rising
proportion of mineral fuel production can account for the change in the proportion of production
made in Pennsylvania.”  Concomitant transportation improvements (canals, railroads) only
further facilitated non-local consumption of Pennsylvania iron.
To arrive at pre-1840 totals, the revised Pennsylvania-to-national trend from Figure 1was
multiplied to an extended annual series on Pennsylvania pig iron production (Table 1, column 4). -9-
10  Fogel accepts Pennsylvania estimates for 1841 from the Philadelphia Commercial List and for
1844 from the Home League survey.  Calendar-year figures for 1849 and 1850 were derived
from Seventh Census returns and shared according to data collected by the Philadelphia
convention of iron masters (Smith 1851, 576–77).  Fogel provides new estimates of
Pennsylvania output for the years 1845–47 based upon the Philadelphia convention data and his
assumption of 50-percent utilization of new furnace construction (see p. 162, table 5.4 for the
derivations).  Fogel adopts the Home League’s 1840 estimate to replace the understated census
figure.  Fogel ostensibly accepts the upper bound of Carey’s 1842 figure to reflect depressed
conditions in the iron industry, thereby effectively endorsing Carey's subjective method. Fogel
linearly interpolated the remaining missing values (1843, 1848) on adjacent U.S. estimates.
11  The shipments represent the sum of descending pig iron tonnage from the Lehigh and
Schuylkill iron districts bound toward Philadelphia.  Shipments data are transcribed from Hunt’s
Merchants’ Magazine (various issues), Annual Reports of the Board of Managers of the Lehigh
Coal and Navigation Company (1831-35), and Jones (1908).
Pennsylvania output is based partially on existing state estimates.
10  Missing observations,
however, have been interpolated using pig iron shipments from the Lehigh and Schuylkill iron
districts.
11  While this approach undoubtedly introduces a degree of measurement error, Figure 2
shows that trends between the two series are highly correlated and display similar turning points. 
This should not be surprising, given that the regions’ shipments accounted for the bulk of pig
iron arriving in Philadelphia.  The Schuylkill and Lehigh Canals opened in the early 1820s and
forwarded pig iron from eastern Pennsylvania furnaces toward a legion of Philadelphia forgeries
and wrought ironworks.
The Pennsylvania series, coupled with the revised ratio curve, provide the basis for the
national estimates.  The extended series is listed in column 6 of Table 1.  Several features of the
U.S. iron estimates should be noted.  Most importantly, the series validates the despondent views
held by furnace owners following the recessions in 1837 and 1839.  While production slipped
after the Panic of 1837, output fell 31 percent from 1839 to 1841 before rebounding sharply. 
The extended pig iron series also revises Fogel’s earliest estimates from 1840 through 1843. -10-
Observations from 1844 through 1853 reflect the Fogel series since differences between column
3 and column 5 are negligible.  However, the revised estimates from 1845–48 validate Fogel’s
(1964, 163) concern that his figures for those years “may be low.”  Differences in 1840 and 1843
reflect additional information from the Pennsylvania series in column 4 and slight discrepancies
in the revised trend equation.  The difference in 1841 is trivial and solely reflects revised trend
values in Figure 1. 
The most significant change from Fogel’s series involves the quantity produced in 1842. 
The difference in 1842 results from discarding the Carey’s pro-tariff (and subjective) estimate
and instead inflating Reeves’s 1842 Harrisburg tabulations in column (4) to national levels.  The
only logical explanation for why Fogel accepts the 1841 Pennsylvania figure but excludes the
1842 observation is that Fogel, like Carey, wished to illustrate the industry’s depression in his
post-1840 series.  In straining to defend Carey’s figure, Fogel argues that the 1842 protectionist
Harrisburg convention is in itself evidence that production was depressed.  This is a valid point,
but depressed since when?   Iron masters certainly must have been concerned that 1841
production had fallen more than one-third below the levels attained before the late 1830s.  More
compelling quantitative evidence points to a rebound in the iron industry by 1842 in lockstep
with other broad sectors of the U.S. economy.  More anecdotally, contemporary observers talked
of forges increasing supply in anticipation of improved market conditions following the
enactment of the tariff on imported iron (Grosvenor 1871; Paskoff 1989, xvii).  
Yet perhaps the most convincing reason why the Fogel–Carey estimate is untenable is
that it implies Pennsylvania accounted for nearly two-thirds of U.S output in 1842 but only one--11-
12 Fogel also struggled to explain his increase in production for 1843.  The revised series displays
a slight drop in output that year.
third the previous year.
12  This change is implausible.
3.  Foreign Competition and the Antebellum U.S. Iron Industry  
The development of the pre-Civil War iron industry and the role of foreign competition
can best be understood by examining data on domestic production, imports, and tariff rates. 
While data on imports are readily available, compiling them is not a straightforward matter. The
volume (by weight) of imports of iron products – encompassing pig iron and bar iron, either
hammered or rolled – is available in the Secretary of the Treasury’s annual Report on Commerce
and Navigation.  A broad definition of imports is required because a simple comparison of
domestic- and foreign-produced pig iron would give a misleading view of foreign competition in
the domestic market.  Imported bar iron, either hammered or rolled, is a close substitute for
domestically-produced pig iron; for example, if the United States imposed higher duties on
imported pig iron, consumers could respond by purchasing more foreign-produced bar iron
instead.  All domestically-produced bar iron, however, originated either from domestic or
imported pig iron.  
Therefore, domestic pig iron production should be compared with effective imports of
pig iron, consisting of both pig and bar iron.  To do so, the import data have been adjusted in two
ways.  First, various sources suggest that 1.25 tons of pig iron were required to make one ton of
bar iron (Engerman 1971, p. 15) .  Therefore, the weight of bar iron imports is multiplied by 1.25-12-
and added to imports of pig iron to arrive at total effective imports of pig iron (what Engerman
calls pig iron equivalents).  Second, the import data are reported on a fiscal year basis (October
to September), whereas domestic production is reported for the calendar year.  Therefore, the
import data are adjusted to match the production data more closely.  Thus, imports in the
calendar year 1830 are calculated as 0.75 times imports in fiscal year 1829-30 plus 0.25 times
imports in fiscal year 1830-31. 
Figure 3 presents domestic production and imports of pig iron from 1827 to 1859 and
shows that fluctuations in production and imports after 1840 were particularly pronounced. 
Significant changes in tariff policy were also an important feature of this period.  In 1842, import
duties were raised significantly, and production of pig iron more than doubled between 1841 and
1847.  Imports did not increase during this period, but rose rapidly after the 1846 Walker tariff
reduced duties on imported iron.  From this point, domestic production collapsed, falling 46
percent from 1847 to 1851, such that the volume of imports actually exceeded domestic
production in 1851 and 1852.  Production then rebounded with imports continuing to increase
until 1853, after which they trailed off.  
Because these fluctuations in production and imports are often associated with changes in
the tariff, the average tariff on imported iron must be calculated.  Table 3 (a) presents the
statutory tariffs for the three classification of goods:  pig iron and bar iron, hammered and rolled. 
Table 3 (b) presents the ad valorem equivalent tariff of the specific duties that were in effect
from 1827 to 1845.  The ad valorem equivalents of the specific duties are calculated by dividing
the duty by the item’s average price, which is approximated by the unit value, i.e., by dividing-13-
13  One complication is that duties collected on imports of rolled iron for railroads – a component
of rolled iron – were rebated between 1831 and 1843.  The value of these rebates is presented in
U.S. Treasury (1857, pp. 8-9) and is deducted from the total tariff revenue collected on rolled
iron imports to arrive at the effective tariff.  The domestic iron industry did not have, and did not
seem interested in developing, the capacity to meet the growing demand for rails.  Railroads
lobbied strenuously to exempt rail imports from the tariff.  The tariff of 1830 granted them a
rebate on the duties paid and the tariff of 1832 made railroad iron duty free.  This exemption was
revoked with the tariff of 1842.  See Fishlow (1965), pp. 133-134.
14  Wallis (2001) notes that the Crisis of 1839 was a greater shock than the more famous Panic of
1837 because it ushered in a four year period of deflation and depression.  As Temin (1964, p.
21) writes, output was initially flat and then declined output during the years 1837 to 1841 due to
“the general depression in American business conditions that followed the boom years of the
previous decade.”  
the value of imports by their weight.
13  The table presents the average ad valorem tariff on
effective pig iron imports, which is an import value-weighted average of the tariffs on the three
import categories, as well as the volume of imports.  By this measure, which is displayed in
Figure 4, the average tariff moved between 30 percent and 60 percent in the 1830s, until lower
import prices and the Tariff Act of 1842 briefly pushed it up to nearly 70 percent.  After 1844,
higher import prices eroded the ad valorem equivalent of the specific duties to such an extent
that the Walker tariff of 1846 (effective in December of that year) reduced the effective tariff on
pig iron from just 43 percent in 1846 to 30 percent in 1847.  
However, tariffs appear to be much less important than import prices in influencing the
cyclical pattern of U.S. output.  As shown in Figure 5, the slight rise in the price of imported iron
goods through the 1830s coincides with the expansion of U.S. production.  In the early 1840s,
however, import prices fell sharply and domestic producers suffered from the nationwide
economic downturn as well.
14  The tariff of 1842 cushioned the fall in import prices, as Figure 5
illustrates, but did not prevent it.  Sharply higher import prices after 1844 pushed domestic-14-
production to record high levels, but the collapse of those prices after 1847 completely erased the
increase in output during the early 1840s and led to the subsequent dramatic surge in imports.  
The tariff reduction in December 1846 had little immediate impact on producers because
domestic prices rose through 1847 as demand continued to expand.  The AISA reported that “the
last half of 1847 and the first part of 1848” was the period of “greatest production” (Fogel 1964,
p. 160).  The collapse in prices was only slightly exacerbated by the Walker tariff reduction
itself, although the shift to an ad valorem tariff, instead of a specific duty, as we shall see,
deprived the industry of a great deal of protection.  Domestic production did not recover until
1852 when import prices started rising again.  
The factors affecting the U.S. iron industry after 1840 are intimately related to
developments in Britain, the source of the overwhelming majority of U.S. imports of iron goods. 
Import prices were the key mechanism by which changes in the British iron market were
transmitted to the United States and affected American production, a point is stressed by
Engerman (1971).  For example, the British railway investment boom in mid-1840s led to a
significant increase in iron prices in both countries (Kenwood 1965).  A commercial crisis at the
end of 1847 in Britain ended the speculative boom and led to a four year decline in prices (Boot
1984, Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz 1953).  U.S. production surged during the British boom, but
collapsed with the steep drop in British export prices.  Specie flowed from the United States to
Britain and U.S. interest rates soared: the rate on short-term commercial paper climbed from 4.7
percent in 1845 to 15.1 percent in 1848 (Historical Statistics 2006, Cj1223). 
U.S. producers blamed British “dumping” of iron in the U.S. market and the Walker tariff
reduction for the distress after 1847.  A group of iron producers assembled in Pittsburgh in-15-
15  The domestic price of pig iron fell 29 percent between 1847 and 1851;  U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1975), series M 218.  
16   See, for example, Smith (1851). This figure is production in 1847 and 1849 divided by
capacity in 1850.  Utilization in 1850 was “obtained simply by deducting from the known make
of 1849, the product of such furnaces as were at work in the former year and not in the latter. 
Nothing was allowed for any diminution consequent on a further decline in prices which took
place in the latter part of the year, nor for stoppages or failures,” according to Smith (1851), p.
576.
August 1849 declared that “the present depressed state of the iron trade has its origin and is
entirely caused by the low rate of duty at which English iron is admitted to this country” (Eiselen
1932, 221).  But the “dumping” was due to the adverse demand shock in Britain rather than a
targeted effort to harm American producers through price discrimination: the price of pig iron in
Britain fell 39 percent between 1847 and 1851, while the U.S. import price of pig iron fell 37
percent over the same period (Mitchell 1988, p. 763; Figure 3).
15  
Although the U.S. economy recovered quickly from the British financial disturbance in
1847-48, the iron industry took much longer to rebound.  Surveys published in contemporary
periodicals revealed that capacity utilization in the Pennsylvania iron industry fell from 71
percent in 1847 to 46 percent in 1849, and then to 36 percent in 1850.
16  In addition, as of May
1850, 48 percent of the furnaces in the state were out of blast, a figure that rose to 56 percent by
November of that year.  Relief finally came in 1853 when the Crimean War diverted British iron
production to domestic uses, thereby driving up British export prices and reducing exports to the
United States. 
These import price shocks force many adjustments upon the American iron industry, part
of which was accomplished by the entry and exit of firms.  As Table 4 shows, the pattern of firm
entry and failure is closely related to the cyclical developments just discussed.  From 1844 to-16-
17  Fogel and Engerman (1969) also examined the determinants of output growth of the
antebellum iron industry, but as Joskow and McKelvey (1971) noted, their model is not clearly
identified.
1846, high prices triggered the construction of many new iron furnaces.  When import prices
reversed themselves starting in 1847, many firms ceased production, either temporarily or
permanently, or were sold. 
Thus, the presence of a substantial import tariff did not prevent U.S. iron producers from
feeling the effects of a high degree of integration with the British market.  Domestic pig iron
producers came under severe stress in the late 1840s largely because of intensified foreign
competition and tariff changes.  The key issue is untangling these various factors to determine
their relative contribution to changes in domestic production.  
4.  Explaining Fluctuations in American Iron Production
The availability of the longer series on U.S. pig iron production presented in section 2
enables us to disentangle the various factors - domestic economic activity, import competition,
and tariff protection - in promoting or retarding the growth of the domestic industry.  The
relative contribution of these factors can be assessed in a simple reduced-form partial
equilibrium model that can be estimated using the existing data for this period.
17  
The framework used here is largely based on Grossman (1986) and treats domestic and
foreign pig iron as imperfect substitutes for one another, as is frequently assumed even in
contemporary models of the iron and steel industry.  Suppressing the time subscripts, the
domestic supply of pig iron is specified as:
(1) log (xS) = ,0 + ,1 log (p/pCPI) + ,2 log (pC/pCPI) + ,3 (time) + >,-17-
18  Regrettably, data on other inputs, such as the price of iron ore, are not readily available.  As
discussed below, wage rates on common labor can be used as other cost shifters, but will not
affect the results.
which states that the quantity supplied by domestic producers (xS) depends upon the relative
price of domestic pig iron (p/pCPI, where p is the price of iron and pCPI is the U.S. consumer price
index), the relative price of coal (pC/pCPI), and a time trend.  The coefficient ,1 is the elasticity of
domestic supply and ,3 reflects trend factors, such as productivity growth, that can affect supply. 
The coefficient ,2 captures the impact of cost shocks, in this case the price of anthracite coal,
which was the most common source of fuel used by the end of sample.
18 
The demand for domestically-produced pig iron is specified as:
(2) log (xD) = 00 + 01 log (p/pCPI) + 02 log (p*[1+J]/pCPI) + 03 log (IP) + .,
which indicates that the quantity demanded depends upon the relative price of domestic pig iron
(p/pCPI), the tariff-inclusive relative price of imported iron (p*[1+J]/pCPI, where p* is the foreign
price and J is the ad valorem tariff), and U.S. industrial production.  Industrial production
(excluding of iron itself) is the relevant demand-shifting variable, rather than a broader measure
such as gross domestic product, because pig iron is not a final consumer good but a raw material
used mainly in the production of other industrial goods.  The coefficient 01 is the own-price
elasticity of demand, 02 is the cross-price elasticity of demand, and 03 is the elasticity of demand
with respect to industrial production.  
    The key relationship of interest is the responsiveness of domestic supply to changes in
the price of imported iron.  Domestic supply is affected indirectly by the price of imported iron
through its impact on the demand for domestic iron.  The closer substitutes that domestic and
foreign iron are in demand, the greater the sensitivity of supply to the price of imports.  The price-18-
of imported iron alone is a sufficient measure of foreign competition because it is plausibly
exogenous; see Grossman (1986) for a discussion of this point.  For example, exports of iron
products to the United States accounted for about 7 percent of British iron production, and thus
U.S. demand was a relatively small part of total British iron output (Mitchell 1988, 281, 300). 
By contrast, the volume of imports is clearly endogenous and depends upon domestic supply and
demand factors, as well as on foreign market conditions.  
Therefore, solving the domestic demand equation for the relative price of domestic pig
iron and substituting it into the domestic supply equation, while noting that xD = xS in
equilibrium, we obtain the following reduced-form equation:  
(3) log (xS) = (0 + (1 log (p*[1+J]/pCPI) + (2 log (IP) + (3 log (pC/pCPI) + (4 (time) + <.
The elasticity of domestic production with respect to the relative price of imports ((1) is a
function of the elasticity of supply and the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand.  This
coefficient should be positive, implying that domestic production is positively related to the
relative price of imported iron goods, because (1 = -,102/(01 - ,1), and ,1 > 0, 02 > 0, and 01 < 0. 
Table 5 presents the results from estimating this equation.  (The data sources are
described at the bottom of the table.)   Estimates of the static version of equation (3) are
presented in column (1), but this specification ignores all the dynamics in the data and
consequently the results are marred by serial correlation.  Column (2) presents a first difference
version of this specification, which corrects for serial correlation but also eliminates any
relationship between the levels of the variables.  To address both issues, column (3) estimates a-19-
19  The ARDL approach has been revived recently in comparison to other dynamic specifications,
such as error-correction mechanisms.  See, for example, Gerrard and Godfrey (1998) and
Pesaran and Shin (1998).  Pesaran and Shin (p. 372) note that “the traditional ARDL approach
justified in the case of trend-stationary regressors is in fact equally valid even if the regressors
are first-difference stationary.”
20  In the simplest ARDL specification takes the form:  yt = $1xt + $2xt-1 + "yt-1 + ut, where the
long-run impact of xt on yt is given by 2 = ($1 + $2)/(1-").  
21  This elasticity is remarkably close to the cross-price elasticity of demand with respect to
import prices (-1.67) estimated by Fogel and Engerman (1969) using different data and different
methods.  Note, however, that we estimate a supply responsiveness while they are estimating a
demand responsiveness parameter.
simple autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) of the same equation.
19  In comparison with
the column (1) result, the column (2) ARDL results show a better fit, lower regression standard
error, and the absence of serial correlation.  The column (2) results indicate that the lagged
relative price of imports has a strong effect on domestic production than the contemporaneous
price.  The long-run elasticity of domestic output with respect to relative import prices is 1.41.
20 
The elasticity of output with respect to import prices is remarkably high, implying that a 10
percent increase in import prices will increase domestic production by about 14 percent.
21   The
long-run impact of industrial production on pig iron output is 1.22, indicating that iron output
was also quite responsive to the general expansion of industry.  
These results are robust to two changes in the underlying data.  First, although there are
regrettably few cost-shifters in the supply equation due to the scarcity of data for the antebellum
period, real wage rates for common laborers in the Northeast from Margo (2000, Table 3A.9)
could included as a supply determinant.  However, in results not reported, the log of the real
wage rate is not statistically significant in the regression and does not alter the coefficients of
interest.  Second, real GDP from Johnston and Williamson (2006) could be used in place of-20-
industrial production.  If specification (3) on Table 5 uses real GDP instead of industrial
production, the long-run elasticity of domestic output with respect to import prices is 1.86
(somewhat higher than the previous finding) and the long-run impact of GDP on domestic output
is 2.87, a larger impact because industrial production grew faster than real GDP during this
period.  However, as we argued above, we believe industrial production is a more appropriate
proxy for iron demand than GDP.
In sum, production in the antebellum U.S. iron industry appears to have been quite
sensitive to the relative price of imports and domestic demand conditions.  Not every antebellum
industry is so sensitive to import competition.  For example, Irwin and Temin (2001) found that
domestic production of cotton textiles in the antebellum period was not very sensitive to changes
in import prices.  The importance of product differentiation in the textile industry may explain
the lower degree of sensitivity to import competition in comparison to the pig iron industry,
where the product is more homogeneous. 
With the aid of these estimates, the impact of the Walker tariff and the import price
decline on domestic production can be determined.  According to Figure 4, by 1845 the specific
duties in the tariff of 1842 had been eroded by higher import prices, so the Walker tariff act
amounted to a reduction in the average applied tariff from 43 percent in 1846 to 30 percent in
1847.  By itself, this would reduce the relative price of imports by 9 percent, calculated as
(1+J1847)/(1+J1846)-1.  A 9 percent reduction in the relative price of imports would reduce
domestic production by about 13 percent, equivalent to nearly 100,000 tons of 1847 production. 
A contemporary estimate held that “had the tariff of 1842 remained unchanged, the produce of
this year would have been greater than that of 1847 by at least 200,000 tons” (“The Tariff of-21-
1846,” 4).  While this appears to be an exaggeration, the tariff reduction still brought about a
significant loss of output by the industry.
By contrast, import prices (exclusive of the tariff) fell 39 percent between 1846 and 1851,
which would translate into an output decline of about 55 percent, or 378,000 tons.  Overall U.S.
industrial production grew 4.5 percent over this period, providing a modest offset in the face of
falling prices.  Domestic production of pig iron actually fell 46 percent between 1847 and 1851,
so it appears that much of this can be explained by the decline in the relative price of imports due
to the lower tariff and lower import prices.  (The measures above overstate their role in reducing
output because they are not relative to changes in the consumer price index.)  Nevertheless, the
decline in import prices was roughly four times more important than the tariff reduction of 1846.
 However, had the specific duties of the 1842 tariff remained in effect, the ad valorem
equivalent would have risen from 43 percent in 1846 to 49 percent in 1847, instead of declining
to 30 percent in that year.  Furthermore, falling import prices would have pushed the ad valorem
equivalent of the 1842 tariff as high as 82 percent by 1851.  While import prices including the
tariff fell by more than 40 percent between 1846 and 1851, they would have fallen only 21
percent had the specific duties remained in effect.  Therefore, the shift from specific to ad
valorem duties deprived the industry of a substantial degree of insulation from import price
shocks.  Retaining the specific duty would have substantially mitigated the fall in domestic
production; instead of falling a projected 65 percent due to the decline in import prices (all other
things equal), output would fall just 32 percent.  The loss of insurance that the shift from specific
to ad valorem duties entailed mattered much more than the amount by which the tariff rates were
cut in 1846.-22-
Another counterfactual experiment is the complete abolition of the tariff.  Eliminating the
tariff in 1846 would produce a fall in the relative price of imports of 30 percent, calculated as
1/(1+J1846)-1, where J1846 = 43 percent.  This would reduce domestic production by 42 percent. 
Therefore, by this calculation, about two-fifths of domestic iron output was dependent upon the
tariff for its existence.  However, this conclusion is not independent of the tariff level.  For
example, the abolition of the 30 percent ad valorem tariff after 1847 and before 1857 would have
reduced the relative price of imports by 23 percent, resulting in a 32 percent decline in domestic
production.  As a general statement, these results suggest that domestic production would have
declined by about one-third to two-fifths - somewhere between 30 percent and 40 percent - in the
absence of the tariff. 
To summarize, domestic production of pig iron was highly sensitive to changes in import
prices in the antebellum period.  Import prices were subject to large swings as cyclical
fluctuations in Britain were transmitted to the United States.  The decline in domestic output
during the late 1840s and early 1850s was more due to a fall in British export prices than to the
Walker tariff reduction.  Our conclusion about the tariff is very similar to Temin’s (1964, p. 23),
who thought it “doubtful” that changes in import duties was the major factor driving changes in
domestic production.  Still, even though the large reduction in domestic output would have taken
place even if import duties had not been reduced in 1846, the tariff reduction in that year still
constituted an extremely severe shock nonetheless.  
We conclude with two related points, one relating to the relationship between the tariff
and technological change in pig iron production, and the other to the relationship between pig
iron producers and the broader iron and steel industry.  Grosvenor (1871) and Taussig (1931)-23-
22   As Taussig (1931, p. 133) put it, “Charcoal iron for general use was a thing of the past;  the
effect of the tariff of 1842 was to call into existence a number of furnaces which used antiquated
methods, and before long must have been displaced in any even by anthracite furnaces.” Hence,
Taussig (p. 134) argued that tariffs “retarded for the United States that cheapening of iron which
has been one of the most important factors in the march of improvement in this century, and
maintained in existence costly charcoal furnaces long after that method had ceased in Great
Britain to be in general use.”
23  Grosvenor (1871, pp. 219-220) argues: “Was it well for the country, then, that Pennsylvania
was paid, at public cost, for erecting so large a number of furnaces destined surely to be closed
and abandoned whenever the use of anthracite became more general?  Pointing to the wrecks
scattered over Pennsylvania, where millions of money were lost by men who were tempted by
the tariff of 1842 into the making of iron at the public expense, the advocate of protection asks
whether the country did not lose by the destruction of these works.  It did lose, not by their
destruction, but by their establishment.  It lost by the investment of large sums of money and
much energy and enterprise in a wasteful instead of profitable manner.” 
argued that an undesirable consequence of the tariff of 1842 was that it perpetuated the use of the
less efficient charcoal furnaces, which were destined to be displaced by anthracite coal
furnaces.
22  While there is evidence to support this claim, the tariff was just one factor at work. 
Because charcoal furnaces were smaller and less expensive to construct than anthracite furnaces,
Paskoff (1983, p. 131) notes that their construction “entailed a level of capitalization well within
reach of an individual or small partnership and did not require the formation of a company.”  As
a result, higher iron prices in early 1840s – due only in part to the higher tariff – prompted the
entry of many small charcoal furnaces that would be unable to survive if prices fell.  
Table 4 confirms this pattern by showing that, between 1844 and 1846, 58 charcoal
furnaces were constructed but just 29 coal furnaces.  But the apparent failure of these entrants
once prices declined  was high as well:  from 1847 to 1850, 80 charcoal furnaces failed but only
11 coal furnaces met a similar fate (although the number of coal burning furnaces was much
small than charcoal furnaces at this time).
23  Yet in the aftermath of the 1840s import shock, the-24-
24  Of course, Knowles and Healey (2006) suggest that a richer set of geographic factors were
responsible for the slow adaptation of mineral fuel technologies rather than factors such as the
tariff.
industry shifted from charcoal to anthracite coal as the primary fuel, with the share of anthracite
iron production increasing from 17 percent in 1849 to 47 percent in 1854 (Warren 1973, p. 18). 
The import shock of the late 1840s may have accelerated this conversion: “the anthracite
furnaces and rolling mills emerged from the 1840s in larger numbers and in robust health. . .
.This was not true of the charcoal-pig-iron sector, in which the effects of the high mortality rate
among existing firms -- 47 percent of the sixty three firms active in 1842 did not survive until
1850 -- were exacerbated by a sharp decline in the number of new firms formed after 1846, the
year of the Walker Tariff.  By 1850 virtually no one with capital and a desire to make money by
producing pig iron was so foolish as to try it by building a charcoal furnace” (Paskoff 1983, pp.
106-107).
24  
Finally, although the focus of this paper has been on how import tariffs promoted greater
production by domestic pig iron producers, there is no presumption that such a policy should
have been the goal of government policy.  This paper has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis
of the protection given to pig iron producers, and in fact the domestic iron industry was sharply
divided over the merits of high tariffs on imported iron. As Paskoff (1983, p. 76) notes, by the
early 1820s the American iron industry had matured into two distinct branches:  pig and bar iron
producers who made the raw material for iron manufacturers, who made pots, stoves, beams and
structures, rails, nails, and other products.  Iron manufacturers had an interest in obtaining
inexpensive pig iron, which led them to oppose protection for pig iron producers.  As Paskoff
(1983, p. 76) writes: “For producers, no amount of protection from imported British iron could-25-
ever be too much protection; for the manufacturers, who purchased foreign as well as domestic
pig and bar iron, rates in excess of pro forma levels were an ‘excessive burden.’  In a series of
memorials and petitions to Congress between 1820 and 1850 each of the two increasingly
antagonistic branches of the industry attempted to persuade the House and Senate of the wisdom,
justice, and public-spiritedness of its position and of the base and groundless character of its
opposition, which had only its own interests, and not those of the nation, at heart.”
5.  Conclusions
This paper has sought to understand the vulnerability of the antebellum iron industry to
foreign competition by presenting a new data series on early U.S. pig iron production that pushes
back existing estimates to 1827.  This series was then used with a new compilation of imports
and import prices to determine the importance of foreign competition and the tariff in affecting
domestic output.  Domestic iron production is found to be highly sensitive to import price
fluctuations.  This sensitivity may account for the strong protectionist sentiment in Pennsylvania
in the nineteenth century (Eiselen 1932), although existing import duties could not prevent price
shocks originating in the British market from having severe repercussions for U.S. producers.  -26-
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Table 1: Estimates of U.S. Pig Iron Production, 1827-1854
Existing U.S. pig iron production estimates Revised PA share Extended/ PA share Difference Final
Pennsylvania of U.S., revised of U.S., U.S.
Year AISA Temin Fogel estimates Fogel U.S. series revised (ths. tons) series
[1] [2] [3] [4] [4]/[3] [5] [4]/[5] [5]-[3] [6]
1827 47,023 129,183           36.4        129,183 
1828 130,000  123,404 44,028  123,404           35.7         123,404 
1829 142,000  134,954  47,039  134,954           34.9         134,954 
1830 165,000  180,598 61,941  180,598           34.3         180,598 
1831 191,000 76,399  223,641           34.2        223,641 
1832 200,000 85,055  249,104           34.1        249,104 
1833 87,170 255,762           34.1        255,762 
1834 84,304 246,745           34.2        246,745 
1835 101,161 294,099           34.4        294,099 
1836 128,018 368,162           34.8        368,162 
1837 138,623 392,821           35.3        392,821 
1838 138,939 386,557           35.9        386,557 
1839 142,475 387,938           36.7        387,938 
1840 286,903   [317,306 - 347,000]  347,000 115,112  33.2  305,895           37.6               (41)       305,895 
1841 278,136 103,450  37.2  267,676           38.6               (10)       267,676 
1842 215,000 230,000 151,885  66.0  381,977           39.8               152        381,977 
1843 358,000 145,967 40.8  348,667           41.9                 (9)       348,667 
1844 486,000 486,000  211,488  43.5  486,000           43.5                 -           486,000 
1845 574,018 253,037  44.1  580,921           43.6                  7         574,018 
1846 765,000   [551,000 - 765,000]  686,865 314,071  45.7  699,260           44.9                12         686,865 
1847 800,000   [597,674 - 800,000]  764,972 361,719  47.3  781,514           46.3                17         764,972 
1848 800,000   [570,000 - 800,000]  696,153  339,219  48.7  711,986           47.6                16         696,153 
1849 650,000   [542,903 - 650,000]  627,334 313,871  50.0  627,334           50.0                 -           627,334 
1850 563,755 563,755  481,381 246,265  51.2  481,381           51.2                 -           481,381 
1851 413,000  207,825  50.3  404,238           51.4                 (9)        413,000 
1852 500,000  540,755  281,341  52.0  536,191           52.5                 (5)        540,755 
1853 723,214  387,631  53.6  726,175           53.4                  3         723,214 
1854 657,337 657,337 657,337 327,685  49.9  657,337           49.9                 -           657,337 -32-
Table 2: Pennsylvania’s Share of the U.S. Pig Iron Industry and Structural Change in Fuel
Technology
U.S. pig iron production, by fuel (%)
PA % of U.S. Anthracite Bituminous
Year pig iron output Charcoal coal coal & coke
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1830                        34.3   falls                    100.0                         -                           -   
1831                        34.2                    100.0                         -                           -   
1832                        34.1                    100.0                         -                           -   
1833                        34.1   * nadir                    100.0                         -                           -   
1834                        34.2                100.0                        -                           -   
1835                        34.4                      100.0                        -                           -   
1836                        34.8   rises                      98.2                        1.5                        0.3 
1837                        35.3   sharply                      96.4                        3.1                        0.5 
1838                        35.9                      94.6                        4.6                        0.8 
1839                        36.7                      92.8                        6.1                        1.1 
1840                        37.6                      91.0                        7.6                        1.4 
1841                        38.6                      87.7                      10.5                        1.8 
1842                        39.8                      84.3                      13.4                        2.2 
1843                        41.9                      81.0                      16.4                        2.6 
1844                        43.5                      77.7                      19.4                        2.9 
1845                        44.1                      74.3                      22.4                        3.2 
1846                        45.7                      71.0                      25.4                       3.6 
1847                        47.3                      68.0                      28.3                       3.7 
1848                        48.7                      65.0                      30.7                       4.3 
1849                        50.0                      62.1                      33.0                       4.9 
1850                        51.2                      59.1                      35.3                        5.6 
1851                        50.3                      56.1                      38.5                        5.5 
1852                        52.0                      53.0                      41.2                        5.8 
1853                        53.6                      49.7                      43.5                        6.8 
1854                        49.9   AISA                      46.5                      46.1                        7.4 
1855                        54.0   AISA                      43.3                      48.7                        8.0 
1856                        55.2   AISA                      41.9                      50.2                        7.9 
Sources: [1] See Table 1. [2]-[4] From 1854, fuel-distribution statistics are provided in AISA, Annual
Reports & Notes.  Earlier values have been prorated on Eavenson's (1942) anthracite and bituminous coal
output shares from charcoal data provided in Bull (1882), Debow (1854), French (1858), Paskoff (1989,
xxxv, table A.1), Pearse (1876), Schallenberg (1975), Swank (1878, 1892), and Temin (1964, 266-7, table
C.2).  Missing observations have been linearly interpolated.  The smelting of pig iron by mineral fuel
commenced shortly after the successful adaptation of British puddling techniques to the hot-blast furnace. 
Anthracite smelting reportedly occurred at the Schuylkill (PA) Furnace in 1836; bituminous coke was
employed shortly thereafter in Fayette County (Swank 1878, 1892).-33-
Table 3: Customs Duties on Imported Iron
A.  Statutory Duties
Year Pig Iron Bar Iron, Hammered Bar Iron, Rolled
1825 50 cents per cwt 90 cents per cwt $1.50 per cwt
1828 62.5 cents per cwt 1 cent per lb. $37 per ton
1832 50 cents per cwt 90 cents per cwt $30 per ton
1842 $9 per ton $17 per ton $25 per ton
1846 30 percent 30 percent 30 percent
1857 24 percent 24 percent 24 percent
Source: Young (1873).  
Note: cwt stands for hundred weight.-34-
B.  Import Volume and Ad Valorem Equivalent Tariff, 1827-1859 














1827 45.7 44.2 37.5 32.8 78.3
1828 57.3 46.1 37.8 35.9 87.7
1829 50.0 48.0 50.6 40.5 107.1
1830 57.0 60.6 54.3 44.9 115.2
1831 70.9 70.8 55.0 47.5 114.7
1832 93.3 52.2 56.2 43.4 66.4
1833 92.0 55.8 42.4 38.9 80.4
1834 90.1 45.5 41.5 37.2 55.8
1835 95.7 44.2 37.7 37.7 52.3
1836 113.3 51.5 30.3 34.1 67.1
1837 109.5 43.1 32.1 32.2 52.6
1838 99.5 32.9 36.9 36.1 30.1
1839 124.2 42.2 38.1 34.8 47.6
1840 97.4 37.2 43.7 35.0 37.9
1841 130.6 57.2 43.7 37.1 68.1
1842 101.5 60.0 34.2 31.9 75.2
1843 85.3 69.5 72.7 33.2 81.9
1844 98.6 66.0 54.1 35.0 80.8
1845 100.5 53.0 46.7 33.0 66.8
1846 91.7 43.3 44.9 30.9 49.3
1847 142.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1848 264.4 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1849 380.6 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1850 420.2 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1851 476.1 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1852 584.4 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0-35-
1853 622.9 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1854 510.9 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1855 409.2 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1856 399.7 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
1857 311.7 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
1858 256.6 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
1859 327.6 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
Note: Calculated from annual the Treasury Department’s annual Commerce and Navigation of
the United States.  Duties are adjusted for drawbacks as discussed in the text.  -36-
Table 4: The Entry and Failure of Blast Furnaces in Pennsylvania, 1840-1850
Year Coal Charcoal





1844 4 6 13 2
1845 14 0 15 2
1846 11 1 30 3
1847 8 1 12 15
1848 5 5 6 20
1849 3 5 2 30
1850* 3 0 0 15
* first four months.
Source: Smith (1851), pp. 580-581.-37-
Table 5: Reduced-Form Estimates of Domestic Pig Iron Production







































log (xS)t-1 -- -- 0.49*
(0.11)
Adj. R
2 0.91 0.32 0.95










Abbreviations: (xS) is domestic output, (p*[1+J]/pCPI) is the relative price of imports, (IP) is
industrial production, (pC/pCPI) is the relative price of coal.
Notes: Time period is 1827 to 1859 (N=33).  Standard errors have been corrected for
heteroscedasticity.  * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
Data Sources: Domestic production: see Table 1.  Price of imports: unit value of imports, as
described in the text.  Average tariff: see Table 3.  Industrial production:  from Davis (2004); 
however, it has been purged of pig iron production, which receives a weight of 0.082 in the
index.  It was purged by calculating the index without pig iron, i.e., (1/0.918)*(IP - 0.082*Pig
Iron).  Price of coal:  the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), series E-129.  Consumer price index: 
David and Solar (1976).  -38-
Figure 1: Trends in Pennsylvania’s Share of U.S. Iron Production -39-
Figure 2: Pennsylvania Iron Shipments and Output Estimates-40-
Figure 3: Domestic Production and Imports of Pig Iron, 1827-1859
Sources: Domestic production from Table 1, column 6 for 1827-1854, 1855-1859 from Temin
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Figure 4: Average Ad Valorem Tariff on Pig Iron Imports, 1827-1859

















Figure 5: Relative Price of Iron Imports, 1827-1859
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